Players coordinate continuation play in repeated games with public monitoring. This paper asks the robustness of such equilibrium play with respect to privatemonitoring perturbations that are ex-ante close to the public-monitoring structure.
Introduction
In repeated games with public monitoring, there is common knowledge about past public signals, and thus the players can take an action profile that is not a static equilibrium by coordinating continuation strategies contingent on those public signals. In this paper, we ask if players can maintain coordination approximately if the monitoring structure is perturbed so that there is no longer common knowledge about past signals.
We formalize this question as follows. Fix a repeated game with public monitoring.
Perturb the game so that players observe noisy private signals. Each player has an "interpretation" of signals, which is a function that maps her private signals to public signals. A private-monitoring structure is close to the public-monitoring structure under a profile of interpretations if, conditional on each action profile, the probability that all players observe private signals that are interpreted as a common public signal y under private monitoring is close to the probability that they observe y under public monitoring. Note that we measure proximity between the two monitoring structures only in the ex-ante sense, and we do not impose any restriction on a player's interim beliefs about the opponents' signals conditional on her own signals. We say that an equilibrium of a public-monitoring repeated game is robust to private-monitoring perturbations if, for every private-monitoring perturbation close to the original public-monitoring structure under a profile of interpretations, there exists an equilibrium of the perturbed game close to the translation of the original equilibrium into private strategies via the same or similar profile of interpretations.
In two-player games with full support of public signals, we show that no perfect public equilibrium (henceforth PPE) is robust to private-monitoring perturbations under a certain regularity condition (Theorem 1). The analysis of PPE in games with public monitoring has flourished since Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) and Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994) . Theorem 1 reveals that such analysis depends critically on the common knowledge assumption on past histories. Except for PPEs that violate the regularity condition, no PPE can be translated into equilibria in all perturbed games. Either a perturbed game has no equilibrium that is close to regular PPEs, or the way to translate a regular PPE depends on fine details of perturbations.
The proof of Theorem 1 goes as follows. Suppose, for simplicity, there are two public signalsȳ and y. Take any PPE, and imagine we are at the beginning of period 2. By the definition of PPE, it is optimal for each player to follow the continuation strategy afterȳ (resp. y) if the opponent also takes the continuation strategy corresponding toȳ (resp. y). Now perturb the monitoring structure. At the beginning of period 2, each player decides an interpretation of her private signal in period 1, and follows the continuation strategy that corresponds to the interpretation. This induces a 2 × 2 coordination game, where the players simultaneously choose their interpretations and payoffs are given by corresponding continuation payoffs in the repeated game. Then, under a regularity condition, either (ȳ,ȳ) or (y, y) is a strictly risk-dominant profile in the 2 × 2 game, and the profile that is riskdominant prevails for all private signals in period 1 when each player is uncertain about the opponent's choice of interpretation, as in the contagion argument given by Rubinstein (1989) and Carlsson and van Damme (1993) . This makes it impossible to maintain players' incentives to play non-equilibrium actions in period 1.
Thus the basic part of the proof is simple. At the technical level, however, we have two more issues. First, PPE may prescribe players to play mixed actions in period 1, which induce a rather complicated prior over the product set of actions and private signals. Here we use the full-support assumption and show that the contagion argument applies to the signal space independently of the realization of the action profile. Second, since signals do not carry payoff-relevant information in the repeated game, a dominance region, where a particular interpretation of signals is a dominant choice in the 2 × 2 game, does not exist in our setting. For this reason, we show the existence of a region with non-trivial size where the players follow the risk-dominant interpretation with large probability. These issues are addressed in Lemma 4. Note that Theorem 1 depends on the regularity condition, which allows us to identify which interpretation,ȳ or y, is strictly risk-dominant in the 2 × 2 game. The regularity condition is satisfied in many PPEs, but violated in all belief-free equilibria, where each player is indifferent between the two interpretations independently of the opponent's interpretation.
Indeed, we show that, in two-player games with an individual rank condition on public signals, every interior belief-free equilibrium is robust to private-monitoring perturbations (Theorem 2).
Belief-free equilibria are arguably one of the most important findings in the literature on private-monitoring repeated games, and have been extensively investigated in the last decade.
1 Given the widespread use of belief-free equilibria, Theorem 2 is probably a "folklore theorem" and hardly surprising. For example, Theorem 2 can be seen as a generalization of Ely, Hörner, and Olszewski (2005, Lemma 3). 2 Nevertheless, it should be noted that Theorem 2 assures that the notion of robustness, as defined in this paper, is not absurdly restrictive.
Note also that Theorem 1 depends implicitly on the assumption that every private signal must be interpreted as some public signal with probability 1. Suppose instead that, after observing private signals that realize with small probability, players can play continuation strategies that do not resemble original continuation strategies contingent on any public signal. Then the proof of Theorem 1 fails and the contagion of risk-dominant interpretation stops near such "uninterpretable" signals. Indeed, we can construct an equilibrium in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with public monitoring that satisfies the regularity condition but can be approximated by equilibria in perturbed games if we allow for uninterpretable signals 1 Belief-free equilibria are first constructed by Piccione (2002) with small probability. See Section 3.3. This example suggests that our non-robustness result is not as straightforward an application of the contagion argument as it might appear to be at the first glance.
Most closely related to our paper are Morris (2002, 2006 show that a strict PPE is robust to almost-public-monitoring perturbations if the PPE has bounded recall. Also, Mailath and Morris (2006) argue that bounded recall is "essentially" necessary for robustness. In our setting, however, since private-monitoring perturbations are small only in the ex-ante sense, conditional on that a player observes a private signal interpreted as a public signal, the probability that the others observe private signals interpreted as the same public signal may be bounded away from 1. Given the larger class of perturbations, our non-robustness result applies to a wider class of equilibrium strategies.
In particular, even strict PPEs with bounded recall are not necessarily robust in our sense.
In repeated games with private monitoring, Peski (2009a) shows that there is no equilibrium other than repetitions of static equilibria if (i) the private-monitoring structure is sufficiently "connected" in the sense that a player's belief about the opponents' signals conditional on her signal changes continuously in her signal, (ii) the continuation strategies depend only on finite partitions of the past histories, and (iii) there are smooth i.i.d. payoff
shocks. 4 There are several differences from our non-robustness result, but the most notable one is that we do not use i. player believes with probability close to 1/2 that the next short-run player has observed a signal below the cutoff and switched to the punishment phase. This diminishes the longrun player's incentive to maintain the cooperation phase. This intuition is similar to the contagion argument we use in our non-robustness result.
In the class of repeated games with perfect monitoring, Ely (2002) introduces the notion of weak robustness, and shows in his Theorem 1 that, there is no strict equilibrium that is weakly robust, except for repetitions of static equilibria. 5 This non-robustness result relies on conditionally independent monitoring, and is logically independent of our non-robustness result, which assumes full-support public monitoring, and can apply to mixed-strategy (hence non-strict) equilibria.
To close the Introduction, we must mention that, although belief-free equilibria are robust to private-monitoring perturbations, they may not be robust to other kinds of perturbations.
Applying the purification exerciseà la Harsanyi (1973) The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines repeated games with public monitoring and their private-monitoring perturbations. Section 3 gives three examples, which motivate us to formalize the notion of robustness to private-monitoring perturbations in Section 4. Sections 5 and 6 show Theorems 1 (non-robustness) and 2 (robustness), respectively.
5 See also Matsushima (1991) . 6 See also Bhaskar (1998) and Bhaskar, Mailath, and Morris (2010).
Framework

Repeated Games with Public Monitoring
We begin our analysis by describing a repeated game with public monitoring. Let I = {1, . . . , n} be the set of players with n ≥ 2. For each i ∈ I, A i is a finite set of actions available to player i in each period. If the players play an action profile a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ A := A 1 × · · · × A n , then a public signal y is drawn from a finite set Y with probability ρ(y | a), and each player i receives ex-post payoff u * i (a i , y), which induces ex-ante expected payoff u i (a) := y∈Y ρ(y | a)u * i (a i , y). The repeated game with public monitoring is the infinite repetition of this game. A history of player i at the beginning of period t is given byh i,t = (a i,1 , y 1 , . . . , a i,t−1 , y t−1 ) ∈
is commonly known at the beginning of period t. A strategy of player i is a functions i from
Let U i (s) denote the discounted expected payoff of player i with discount factor δ when players obey a profiles = (s 1 , . . . ,s n ). A strategy profiles is a sequential equilibrium if, for each i andh i ∈H i , the continuation strategys i |h i is a best response to the distribution
(conditional onh i ) that is consistent withs.
A strategy is public if it only depends on the public component of the history:s i :H := tH t → ∆A i . A public-strategy profiles is a perfect public equilibrium (PPE ) if, for each h ∈H, the induced continuation strategy profiles |h = (s 1 |h, . . . ,s n |h) is a Nash equilibrium of the repeated game, i.e., U i (s |h) ≥ U i (s i ,s −i |h) for all i ∈ I,h ∈H, ands i .
The public-monitoring structure (Y, ρ) has full support if ρ(y | a) > 0 for all a ∈ A and y ∈ Y .
Private-Monitoring Perturbations
The objective of this paper is, given an equilibrium of the repeated game with public monitoring, to check the robustness of the equilibrium to private-monitoring perturbations. For this purpose, we consider private-monitoring perturbations as follows.
A perturbed game is a repeated game with private monitoring. In each period, if the players play an action profile a ∈ A, a profile ω = (ω 1 , . . . , ω n ) of private signals is drawn from a product Ω := Ω 1 × · · · × Ω n of measurable spaces according to joint probability π(· | a). Each player i observes ω i ∈ Ω i , interprets it as f i (ω i ) ∈ Y , and receives ex-post
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A private history of player i at the beginning of period t is given by h i,t = (a 
be the corresponding history in the original game.
We define the closeness of private monitoring to public monitoring in the following sense. Definition 1. For ε ≥ 0, a private-monitoring structure (Ω, π, f ) is ex-ante ε-close to the public-monitoring structure (Y, ρ) if
This definition says that the probability that every player observes a signal interpreted as y in the private-monitoring structure is close to the probability that every player observes 7 One can extend all the results in this paper to non-stationary perturbations, where the monitoring structure (Ω t , π t , f t ) is indexed by t.
y in the public-monitoring structure. Note that the definition of ex-ante closeness does not impose any restriction on a player's interim beliefs about the opponents' signals conditional on her own signals. This is in contrast with the approach by Morris (2002, 2006) , who require both ex-ante closeness (Definition 1) and interim closeness, that is,
for all i ∈ I, a ∈ A, and ω i ∈ f −1 i (y) whenever the conditional probability is well defined. 
Examples
In this section, we give three examples to illustrate how private-monitoring perturbations prevent players from coordinating their future play. These examples also motivate the formal definition of robustness in Section 4.
One-Period Punishment
The first example is the prisoners' dilemma game with two signals, taken from Mailath and Morris (2002, Section 3.1). Let I = {1, 2}, A 1 = A 2 = {C, D}, and Y = {y, y}. Each signal realizes with probability from Ω i to Y ∪ {∅}. Here, f i (ω i ) = ∅ means that ω i is an "uninterpretable" signal with no corresponding public signal. We will discuss the issue of uninterpretable signals in Section 3.3. We assume that 0 < p < 1 so that both signals occur with positive probabilities when the players play CC. The ex post utility function u * i (a i , y) is represented by the following matrix:
Then, the ex-ante stage-game payoffs are given by
We consider the following public strategy:
Under this strategy, players punish each other for one period immediately after y is observed.
We assume r ≥ q and δ ≥ (3p − 2q − r) −1 so that the profiles = (s 1 ,s 2 ) is a perfect public equilibrium.
Given the repeated prisoners' dilemma and the one-period-punishment strategy above, we define the following 2 × 2 game:
where each player i chooses an action from {y, y}, and she receives payoff
when she plays y i and the opponent j = i plays y j . Note that the values along the diagonal are the players' continuation payoffs in the public-monitoring repeated prisoners' dilemma after corresponding public histories, whereas the values off the diagonal are the payoffs when the players fail to coordinate on their future play, which play no clear role in the analysis of public monitoring without perturbations. Sinces is a symmetric PPE, G(s) is a symmetric coordination game with two pure-strategy equilibria (y, y) and (y, y). We assume that one strictly risk-dominates the other, i.e.,
We perturb the monitoring structure as follows. Each action profile a ∈ A generates a real number θ, which is uniformly distributed on
or DC, and on [r − 1, r] if a = DD. As in Carlsson and van Damme (1993) , each player i observes a noisy signal ω i about θ:
where ξ We will show that the perturbed game has no equilibrium that approximates the oneperiod-punishment strategy. For the sake of concreteness, we focus on the following threshold strategy: in period 1, play C; in period t ≥ 2, play C if and only if ω i,t−1 ≥ω.
Claim 1.
There exist η > 0 andε > 0 such that, if 0 < ε ≤ε and |ω| ≤ η, then the threshold strategy with thresholdω is not an equilibrium of the perturbed game.
Proof. Pick sufficiently small η,ε > 0. Suppose that (y, y) strictly risk-dominates (y, y) in
Consider player i's private history at the end of period 1 such that she observes ω i,1 below but sufficiently close toω. She believes that the opponent j observes ω j,1 aboveω with probability close to 1/2, and hence expects that the opponent followss j | y ands j | y with almost equal probabilities in the future. Since (y, y) risk-dominates (y, y) in G(s), player i strictly prefers s i | y tos i | y, which implies that the threshold strategy is not an equilibrium.
It is clear from the proof that Claim 1 does not depend on particular choices of payoffs or strategies. The proof only uses the fact that the induced game G(s) has a strictly riskdominant equilibrium. In Section 5, we extend Claim 1 to other PPEs and show the nonrobustness of such equilibria even if we allow for non-threshold strategies in perturbed games.
Note that, since the one-period-punishment strategy has bounded recall, it is robust to private-monitoring perturbations that are both ex-ante and interim close to the publicmonitoring (Mailath and Morris, 2002) . Thus, Claim 1 exemplifies that the notion of robustness is sensitive to the class of perturbations to which robustness is tested.
The Ely-Välimäki Equilibrium
Consider the repeated prisoners' dilemma with the same ex-ante payoff matrix as before, but assume perfect monitoring this time. The following strategy is adapted from Ely and
In this strategy, if a player plays C, it costs her 1 in the current period, but induces the opponent to play C in the next period with additional probability α − β. Therefore, if This equilibrium is belief-free: for each i and t, whether player j will take αC
as long as the ex ante probability that player j will play αC + (1 − α)D in period t + 1 is 1 after observing a i,t = C and the ex ante probability that player j will play βC + (1 − β)D in period t + 1 is 1 after observing a i,t = D, player i is indifferent between C and D in period t. That is, player i has (weak) incentives to follow the equilibrium without coordinating her play with player j.
We have the following.
Claim 2. If α < 1, β > 0, and α − β = 1/(3δ), then the Ely-Välimäki equilibrium is robust to private-monitoring perturbations in the following sense. For every T < ∞, there exists ε > 0 such that, for every private-monitoring perturbation (Ω, π, f ) that is ex-ante ε-close to (Y, ρ), the perturbed game admits an equilibrium s = (s 1 , s 2 ) such that
for all t ≤ T , i ∈ I, and h i,t ∈ H i,t .
Sketch of Proof. As explained above, in the Ely-Välimäki equilibrium, each player faces the trade-off between payoffs in the current and the next periods. This trade-off is independent of whether the opponent is expected to play C with probability α or β (or an in-between probability in expectation) in the current period as long as the ex ante probability of taking We need a slightly more careful argument, however. In the perturbed game, since the marginal probability of f j (ω j ) can be slightly different. In that case, ex-ante payoffs are also slightly different from those in the original game. Also, a player's action leads to rewards or punishments in the next period with probabilities slightly different from those under perfect monitoring. Therefore, to keep the player being exactly indifferent between C and D, her continuation payoffs must be adjusted appropriately. We make this adjustment by modifying strategies after period T . This is possible as long as ε is small and we have enough slacks in all the variables, which are guaranteed by assuming α < 1 and β > 0 (and hence δ > 1/3).
For a complete proof, see Theorem 2, which generalizes Claim 2.
The intuition behind the robustness is straightforward: as we have seen in Claim 1, the coordination of the future play based on the past signals is difficult in the perturbed game.
The belief-free equilibrium, on the other hand, does not require the coordination based on the past signals and all what is important is the ex ante probability. Therefore, it is robust to private-monitoring perturbations that are ex-ante close to the public monitoring structure.
However, as the second paragraph of the sketch of the proof indicates, for Claim 2, we need to allow for small departures from the original equilibrium to make adjustments in continuation payoffs. This motivates us to introduce (η, T )-closeness in the next section, which basically requires that the equilibrium should be close until period T but the continuation play after period T can be completely different.
Threshold Strategies with Buffers
In Claim 1, we require that each player always interpret her private signal as some public signal and follow the same continuation strategy as that in the original game via the interpretation. Instead, if we allowed for a small "buffer area" between the region where the signals are interpreted asȳ and the region where the signals are interpreted as y, and did not restrict their continuation strategies after observing signals in that buffer area, then the proof based on the contagion argument would fail, which opens the possibility that there may be an equilibrium in the perturbed game that approximates the original equilibrium. In what follows, we argue that it is indeed the case by constructing an equilibrium in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with public monitoring (but different from the one-period-punishment strategy) such that robustness is sensitive to whether we allow for such a "buffer area" or not.
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Let us explain the "buffer area" more specifically. Fix some strategy profiles in a game with public monitoring. Take η > 0 arbitrarily. Consider the global-game perturbation 11 As we will see, the following example uses a private-strategy equilibrium and not a PPE. However, since this strategy prescribes a pure action profile in period 1 and the induced 2 × 2 game after that action profile is regular, the non-robustness result holds if we do not allow for a "buffer area." See Corollary 2 for the formal statement.
with ε > 0, as we introduced in Subsection 3.1.
12 Suppose we only require that player i interpret ω i asȳ if ω i ≥ ε/2; y if ω i ≤ ε/2. Given these interpretations, her strategy s i in the perturbed game satisfies |s i (h i,t ) −s i (f i (h i,t ))| < η for all t ≥ 1 and h i,t ∈ H i,t such that
On the other hand, if there exists t with ω i,t ∈ (−ε/2, ε/2), we do not restrict the continuation strategy after any history that contains such ω i,t .
The next lemma shows two important features of the buffer area in the global-game perturbation.
Lemma 1. There existsε > 0 such that, for each i and for any ε <ε, the global-game perturbation with ε satisfies the following conditions with Ω ε i = R \ (−ε/2, ε/2).
For any
, conditional on that player j's signal belongs to Ω ε j , the probability that player j's interpretation is the same as player i's interpretation f i (ω i ) is sufficiently high, i.e., Pr
The probability that player i's signal belongs to
Condition 1 of Lemma 1 means that, if player i observes a signal ω i not in the buffer area and knows that the opponent j also observes some signal not in the buffer area (but does not know which signal), then she believes with large probability that the opponent j interprets his signal in the same way as player i interprets ω i . Notice that, if we required player i does not necessarily put large probability on that event. Indeed, if ω i = ±ε/2, then he puts probability only 1/2 that ω j ∈ Ω ε j . Our objective is to construct an equilibrium in a game with public monitoring such that, by properly specifying continuation strategies after observing signals in the buffer area (−ε/2, ε/2), we can separate the regions above ε/2 and below −ε/2 and players outside the buffer area can coordinate their strategies within each of these regions of the globalgame perturbation. (Continuation strategies after signals in the buffer area are completely differently from the original equilibrium, but their incentive constraints must be satisfied in the perturbed game.) Formally, we will construct an equilibriums in a game with public monitoring such that, for every η > 0, there existsε > 0 such that, for every global-game perturbation with ε <ε, the perturbed game admits an equilibrium s such that
The construction of a desired equilibrium goes as follows. Consider the two-player prisoner's dilemma with public monitoring as in Section 3.1. We assume
In each odd period t = 1, 3, . . ., each player i determines a state x i ∈ {G, B}. (How the state is determined will be discussed later.) In each odd period t, player i takes C if x i = G; D if
In the next (even) period t + 1, she takes C if she observes y t =ȳ; D if she observes
With a slight abuse of notations, lets i (x i ) denote her action plan in periods t and
, y t+1 ) be the probability that player j's next state will be G in period t + 2 if her current state is x j in period t and she observesh j = 13 It is possible to construct a robust equilibrium even without this assumption.
(a j,t , y t , a j,t+1 , y t+1 ) for the last two periods. We determine p j [x j ](h j ) as follows.
1. Conditional on x j = G, player i is indifferent between C and D in period t; strictly prefers C in period t + 1 if she observes y t =ȳ; strictly prefers D in period t + 1 if she observes y t = y. That is, if player j playss j (G) followed by transition probabilities
are best responses for player i in period t, and player i has strict incentives in period t + 1.
2. Conditional on x j = B, player i is indifferent between C and D in both periods t and t + 1. Any strategy is a best response for player i in period t if player j playss j (B)
followed by transition probabilities
We specify p j [x j ](h j ) so that conditional on x j ∈ {G, B}, boths i (G) ands i (B) are optimal and attain v i (x j ):
where the maximization is taken over all behavioral strategies for the two periods t and t + 1.
We also want to have v i (G) > v i (B), i.e.,s j (G) is a "good" strategy for player i;s j (B) is a "bad" strategy for player i.
For sufficiently large δ, it is equivalent to consider the following "reward functions"
is uniformly bounded with respect to δ,
Then, We further specify those reward functions as follows.
1. At state x j = G:
is additively separable and independent of (a j,t , a j,t+1 ), i.e.,
is the reward for period t + 1 after y t . 
ii. After y t = y, θ j [G](y, y t+1 ) = 0 for all y t+1 (no reward) so that player i strictly prefers D to C. 
2. At state x j = B: 
First, consider state x j = G. 
We can give player i strict incentives to play C after y t =ȳ at state x j = G by setting
for sufficiently small κ > 0, where, thanks to (2), θ j [G](ȳ) < 0 for sufficiently large δ. We 
By (10) and (11) together with (1), we have
Finally, by setting the initial states x 1 = x 2 = G in period 1, we can completely specify an entire profiles = (s 1 ,s 2 ) of equilibrium strategies for sufficiently large δ.
14 Claim 3. For sufficiently large δ, the above equilibriums is robust to global-game perturbations with buffer areas. That is, for every η > 0, there existsε > 0 such that, for every global-game perturbation with ε <ε, the perturbed game admits an equilibrium s = (s 1 , s 2 )
such that
We take sufficiently large δ so that
for all i ∈ I, t ≥ 1, and h i,t ∈ H i,t with ω i,τ ∈ Ω ε i = R \ (−ε/2, ε/2) for all τ ≤ t − 1.
Proof. See Appendix.
Note that, although both Claims 2 and 3 establish robustness to private-monitoring perturbations, underlying logics behind these claims are entirely different. In Claim 2, the key was the belief-freeness property of the Ely-Välimäki equilibrium such that players do not need to coordinate their future play. In contrast, players do need to coordinate in the equilibrium used in Claim 3. For example, in period 2, players coordinate to play CC if they observeȳ and DD if they observe y. Also, since (6) is satisfied with strict inequality, the induced 2 × 2 game G(s) is a coordination game with two strict equilibria, and generically one of them strictly risk-dominates the other. This implies that, by applying the contagion argument used in Claim 1, one can show that this equilibrium is not robust to global-game perturbations if we do not allow for a buffer area. Thus it is not the belief-freeness but the possibility of a buffer area that makes this equilibrium robust.
The proof of Claim 3 is involved, but the equilibrium we construct in the perturbed game has the following structure. The equilibrium is recursive every odd period as in the original (public-monitoring) game. In each odd period t, each player i decides a state x i ∈ {G, B}, and then follows an action plan in the next two periods (periods t and t + 1), denoted by
i (y) (i.e., ω i,t ≤ −ε/2); her action will be specified later if ω i,t / ∈ Ω ε i (i.e., ω i,t ∈ (−ε/2, ε/2)).
To distinguish it from the reward function in the original game, for each state x i ∈ {G, B} and each private history h i = (a i,t , ω i,t , a i,t+1 , ω i,t+1 ), we write θ 
(b) In period t + 1, i. After player j observes ω j,t ∈ Ω ε j (i.e., |ω j,t | ≥ ε/2), we set θ
ii. After player j observes ω j,t / ∈ Ω ε j (i.e., ω j,t ∈ (−ε/2, ε/2)), we determine θ ε j [G](ω j,t , a j,t+1 , f j (ω j,t+1 )) so that player i is indifferent between C and D in period t + 1, conditional on a j,t+1 .
(c) In period t, we determine θ ε j [G](f j (ω j,t )) so that player i is indifferent between C and D in period t.
2.
At state x j = B:
(a j,t+1 , f j (ω j,t+1 )) so that player i is indifferent between C and D in period t + 1, conditional on a j,t+1 .
(c) In period t, we determine θ ε j [B](f j (ω j,t )) so that player i is indifferent between C and D in period t.
Finally, we set player i's action in period t + 1 so that, after she observes ω i,t / ∈ Ω ε i , she plays a best response (if there are multiple best responses, we choose one arbitrarily) to player j's strategy s j (G) at state x j = G, given i's belief about ω j,t . Now we want to show that the above strategy constitutes an equilibrium in the perturbed game. We first verify player i's incentive at the beginning of period t + 1, after observing (a i,t , ω i,t ). Since any action is optimal if x j = B, regardless of player i's belief about x i , player i plays a best response to s j (G). Further, Condition 1-(b)-ii ensures that player i plays a best response to s j (G) conditional on that ω j,t ∈ Ω ε j . Conditional on the event that x j = G and ω j,t ∈ Ω ε j , Condition 1-(b)-i together with Lemma 1 implies that after observing ω i,t ∈ Ω ε i , player i believes that player j observes ω j,t ∈ f −1 j (f i (ω i,t )), i.e., player j's interpretation of ω j,t is the same as player i's interpretation of ω i,t , with large probability. Note that player i has a strict incentive in the original equilibriums, and we use the same reward function after ω j,t ∈ Ω ε j . Thus, in the perturbed game, if ε is sufficiently small, player i strictly prefers C after observing ω i,t ∈ f −1 i (ȳ) and D after observing ω i,t ∈ f −1 i (y). What remains to be checked is player i's incentive in period t. Note that, due to Lemma 1, the probability that player j will observe ω j,t / ∈ Ω ε j is small. Thus, player i's continuation payoffs in the perturbed game are close to those in the original game in expectation at the beginning of period t, for each state x j . Hence, we can take a reward function
Therefore, for each x i , x j ∈ {G, B}, the above two-period strategy s i (x i ) is optimal for player i against s j (x j ), given the reward function θ 
A similar equilibrium construction is used in Hörner and Olszewski (2006), who consider "block strategies" s i (G) and s i (B) such that conditional on s j (G), both s i (G) and s i (B) are optimal (but there may be non-optimal strategies), and that conditional on s j (B), any strategy is optimal regardless of player i's beliefs about player j's private histories.
15 Since
Hörner and Olszewski (2006) assume almost-perfect monitoring and the canonical signal space Ω i = A j , as long as player i observes a signal sequence that occurs with positive probability in player j's equilibrium strategy, player i believes with high probability that player j observes the signal that corresponds to the realization of player i's strategy. Thus there is almost common knowledge between the players about their histories that occur with positive probability in equilibrium. In contrast, in our equilibrium, even if y occurs with positive probability in the original equilibrium and ω i,t ∈ f −1 i (y), if ω i,t is close to 0 in the global-game perturbation, player i puts beliefs only 1/2 on the event that player j interprets her signal as y, which destroys the almost common knowledge property about interpretations 15 Hörner and Olszewski (2006) also consider games with more than two players. of private histories.
Definition of Robustness
An equilibrium in the repeated game with public monitoring is robust to private-monitoring perturbations if, for any T < ∞, whenever private-monitoring perturbations are sufficiently small in the ex-ante sense, then there exists an equilibrium of the perturbed game that is close to the original equilibrium for the first T periods. The formal definition is given below.
Definition 2. Fix a private-monitoring perturbation (Ω, π, f ), η ≥ 0, and T ≤ ∞.
For each
2. A profile s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) of strategies in the perturbed game is (η, T )-close tos via
for all i ∈ I, t ≤ T , and h i,t = (a
Definition 3. A sequential equilibriums of a public-monitoring repeated game is robust to private-monitoring perturbations if, for every η > 0 and T < ∞, there exists ε > 0 such that, for every private-monitoring perturbation (Ω, π, f ) that is ex-ante ε-close to (Y, ρ), there exist a sequence {g t } of interpretations and a Nash equilibrium s of the perturbed game such that each g t is η-close to f and s is (η, T )-close tos via {g t }.
In the above definition of robust equilibria, we are allowed to choose {g t } to construct an equilibrium in the perturbed game that approximates the original equilibrium. For this reason, we call {g t } "endogenous" interpretations. We require that those endogenous interpretations be equal to exogenous interpretations f with large probability for the first T − 1 periods, but can be different with small probability or after period T . In this sense, the notion of endogenous interpretations generalizes threshold strategies in Section 3.1, where the endogenous thresholdω can be different from but must be close to the exogenous threshold 0. (Of course, we allow for more flexible interpretations than thresholds. For example, g i,t
may depend on her entire private history (ω
i , a i,t ).) If instead the strategy profile translated via the exogenous interpretations f were required to be an equilibrium in the perturbed game, that is, if exogenous and endogenous interpretations were required to be equal with probability 1, then one could prove almost immediately that there is no robust strict equilibrium other than repetitions of static equilibria.
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Note that we require the closeness between exogenous and endogenous interpretations only for the first T − 1 periods. It is because we will make small adjustments in continuation strategies after T to deal with small changes in the marginal distribution, as we discussed in Section 3.2. Note also that we do not allow for buffer areas as in Section 3.3.
Suppose that the perturbed game has an equilibrium that approximates the original equilibrium. Then player i's equilibrium payoff in the perturbed game is close to her equilibrium payoff in the original game. Moreover, conditional on that each player j takes a j and interprets his signal as y j , player i's continuation payoff in the perturbed game is close to U i (s 1 | a 1 , y 1 , . . . ,s n | a n , y n ). It is obvious from the above definitions, but worth stating explicitly.
Lemma 2. Fix a strategy profiles in the repeated game with public monitoring. For every γ > 0, there exist η > 0, T < ∞, and ε > 0 such that, if a private-monitoring perturbation 16 One could prove such a non-robustness result by considering a perturbation such that player i receives a signal ω i with small probability, where she interprets ω i as y but, conditional on ω i , she believes with probability 1 that the other players interpret their signals as y = y.
(Ω, π, f ) is ex-ante ε-close to (Y, ρ), a profile g t of endogenous interpretations is η-close to f for every t ≤ T − 1, and a profile s of strategies in the perturbed game is (η, T )-close tos via {g t }, then player i's continuation payoff in the perturbed game conditional on a 1 and ω 1 is within distance γ from U i (s 1 | a 1,1 , g 1 (ω 1,1 | a 1,1 ) , . . . ,s n | a n,1 , g n (ω n,1 | a n,1 )).
A Non-Robustness Result
In this section, we extend Claim 1 and provide a sufficient condition for non-robustness. For simplicity, assume that the public-monitoring repeated game has two players I = {1, 2} and two public signals Y = {y, y}, and the public-monitoring structure has full support. We concentrate on a public perfect equilibrium (Extensions to general stage games and private strategies are discussed at the end of this section.) As in Section 3.1, a PPEs induces the following 2 × 2 game:
with two pure-strategy equilibria (y, y) and (y, y). Since the action of player i in period 1, a i,1 , does not affect the continuation strategy of player i in the public strategy except for the effect on the interpretation through g i , we can omit the dependence of the continuation payoff on the action profile in period 1, a 1 .
We assume that the 2 × 2 coordination game G(s) is regular in the following sense.
with two pure-strategy equilibria (α 1 , α 2 ) and (β 1 , β 2 ) is regular if (α 1 , α 2 ) and (β 1 , β 2 ) have different Nash products in the normalized game
The regularity condition is easily satisfied in many pure-strategy PPE. For example, ifs is a strict PPE under some parameters and not a repetition of static equilibria, thens is regular under almost all nearby parameters in the monitoring structure, payoffs, and discounting.
Also the regularity condition is not inconsistent with mixed-strategy PPEs.
Theorem 1.
Ifs is a PPE of a public-monitoring repeated game with two players, two public signals, and full support, and G(s) is regular, thens is not robust to private-monitoring perturbations.
Proof. Suppose thats is a regular PPE robust to private-monitoring perturbations. For each ε > 0, we will construct a private-monitoring perturbation (Ω, π, f ) that is ex-ante ε-close to (Y, ρ) such that the perturbed game has no equilibrium close tos, contradictory to our assumption.
By the regularity of G(s), after changing the labels of y and y if necessary, there exist
i.e.,
for all i ∈ I.
The following lemma shows that the similar risk dominance property holds for the coordination game where we replace public signals with the endogenous interpretations.
Lemma 3. There exist η > 0, T < ∞, and ε > 0 such that the following is true. Suppose that (Ω, π, f ) is ex-ante ε-close to (Y, ρ), g t is η-close to f for every t ≤ T − 1, and s is an equilibrium of the perturbed game that is (η, T )-close tos via {g t }. Then, for every i ∈ I
Proof of Lemma 3. Pick any i ∈ I and a i,1 ∈ supp s i (∅). If player i believes that, regardless of a j,1 ∈ supp s j (∅), player j interprets g j,1 (ω j,1 | a j,1 ) = y with probability no less than p i , then, by Lemma 2 and (12), player i receives a higher payoff if she interprets ω i,1 as y and
For the rest of the proof, we take the global-game perturbation as in Section 3.1. More precisely, let Ω 1 = Ω 2 = R and π = π ε , where, conditional on each a ∈ A, π ε (· | a) denotes the joint distribution of ω = (ω 1 , ω 2 ) induced by the uniform distribution of (θ,
Since (Y, ρ) has full support, let B := min a,y ρ(y | a) > 0. The following lemma follows from the characteristics of the perturbation in period 1.
Lemma 4.
There exist η, ε, d, C 1 , C 2 , D > 0 such that the following is true.
(i) For every η < η and ε < ε, if g 1,1 satisfies
(ii) For every ε > 0 and x ∈ [−B + Dε, B − Dε], we have
for all i ∈ I, a 1 ∈ A, and
Proof of Lemma 4. See Appendix.
Fix any η < min{B, η, η} and T > T . By the robustness ofs, there exists ε η,T > 0 such that, for every ε < min{ε η,T , ε, ε}, there exist a sequence {g t } of endogenous interpretations and an equilibrium s of the perturbed game such that each g t is η-close to f , and s is (η, T )-close tos via {g t }. This implies (13) is satisfied. By Lemma 4 (i), there exists
that player 1 interprets ω 1,1 as y with probability more than p 2 . By Lemmas 3, player 2 interprets ω 2,1 as y on the equilibrium path. By Lemma 4 (ii), player 1 with private signal
believes that player 2 interprets ω 2,1 as y with probability more than p 1 , and, by Lemma 3, player 1 interprets ω 1,1 as y on the equilibrium path.
Once again, by Lemma 4 (ii), player 2 with private signal
believes that player 1 interprets ω 1,1 as y with probability more than p 2 , and, by Lemma 3, player 2 interprets ω 2,1 as y on the equilibrium path. By induction, each player i interprets
as y on the equilibrium path. Since this is true for all ε < min{ε η,T , ε, ε}, this is a contradiction.
Theorem 1 extends easily to games with more than two public signals as follows. Pick an arbitrary pair of the public signals from Y and name them y and y. If a public signal y =ȳ, y realizes, both players observe y directly. Ifȳ or y realizes, then the players observe perturbed signals. We require that players' endogenous interpretations after observing such private signals be either y or y.
Corollary 1.
Ifs is a PPE of a public-monitoring repeated game with two players and full support and there exist two signalsȳ and y such that G(s) is regular, thens is not robust to private-monitoring perturbations.
Theorem 1 also extends to games with more than two players under an additional condition. (Here we assume two public signals or use the trick as above.) For a PPEs, let G(s) be the n-player game, where each player i's action set is {y, y}, and her payoff is
is weakly increasing as each player j = i switches from y j = y to y. A supermodular game G(s) is regular if either (y, . . . , y) or (y, . . . , y) is a contagious equilibrium in an open neighborhood of G(s). 17 Under these definitions, Theorem 1 generalizes to games with more than two players.
We point out that Theorem 1 holds for equilibria in private (non-public) strategies as long as the players play a pure action profile in period 1 and the 2 × 2 coordination game induced by continuation payoffs after that action profile is regular.
Corollary 2.
Ifs is a sequential equilibrium of a public-monitoring repeated game with two players and full support,s(∅) is pure, and there exist two signalsȳ and y such that G(s) is regular afters(∅), thens is not robust to private-monitoring perturbations.
A Robustness Result
In this section, we show that belief-free equilibria are robust to private-monitoring perturbations. Once again, we focus on two-player games.
Definition 5 (Ely, Hörner, and Olszewski, 2005). A pair of strategiess = (s 1 ,s 2 ) in the repeated game with public monitoring is a belief-free equilibrium if, for every i ∈ I and
The Ely-Välimäki equilibrium we discussed in Section 3.2 is a belief-free equilibrium.
Note that no belief-free public equilibrium induces a regular 2 × 2 game since boths i,t |ȳ ands i,t | y are the best responses to boths j,t |ȳ ands j,t | y
We also define belief-free equilibria for the perturbed game. Namely, a pair s = (s 1 , s 2 ) of strategies in the perturbed game is a belief-free equilibrium if, for every i ∈ I, h i,t ∈ H i,t , 17 An equilibrium of a static game G is contagious if it is selected in a global game with some noise distribution. Frankel, Morris, and Pauzner (2003) show that every supermodular game has at least one (and only one, generically) contagious equilibrium.
and h j,t ∈ H j,t , s i | h i,t is a best response for player i against s j | h j,t in the perturbed game starting in period t.
Unperturbed Marginal Distributions
Suppose defined by
for all t ≥ 1, i ∈ I, and h i,t = (a
, is a belief-free equilibrium of the perturbed game.
General Perturbations
With a slight perturbation on the marginal distributions of interpreted signals, a belieffree equilibrium may not be an equilibrium in the perturbed game with the straightforward interpretation for all t. As we saw in Section 3.2, however, we can restore players' incentives by modifying future actions. 
for all a i ∈ A i with equality if a i ∈ A i , where the expectation is taken over (a j , y) generated by (a i , α j ) and ρ.
Definition 6. A belief-free equilibriums is compatible with a sequence {A t } of regimes if the following conditions are satisfied for all t ≥ 1, i ∈ I,h i,t ∈H i,t , andh j,t ∈H j,t :
2. V i (s j |h j,t ) is A i,t -enforced bys j (h j,t ) and {V i (s j | (h j,t , a j,t , y t ))} a j,t ∈A j ,yt∈Y .
Every belief-free equilibrium is compatible with some sequence of regimes.
18 For notational simplicity, we focus on a fixed regime: A t = A for all t ≥ 1. 19 For a given regime A, the set of all belief-free equilibria that are compatible with A satisfies the following properties. We say that a belief-free equilibriums = (s 1 ,s 2 ) compatible with A is interior if
Theorem 2. Ifs is an interior A-compatible belief-free equilibrium of a public-monitoring repeated game with two players, every pure action has individual full rank in (Y, ρ), and W (A) is properly self-A-generating, thens is robust to private-monitoring perturbations.
Proof. Fix T < ∞. We will show that there exists ε > 0 such that, if a private-monitoring perturbation (Ω, π, f ) is ex-ante ε-close to (Y, ρ), then the perturbed game admits a belief-free equilibrium that is (0, T )-close tos via f .
For each i ∈ I, a ∈ A, and y ∈ Y , define
Sinces is an interior belief-free equilibrium compatible with A, for every t ≥ 1, i ∈ I, h i,t ∈H i,t , andh j,t ∈H j,t , we have
for all a i,t ∈ A i with equality if a i,t ∈ A i , and w i (A) < V i (s j |h j,t ) < w i (A), where the expectation is taken over (a j,t , y t ) generated by (a i,t ,s j (h j,t )) and ρ.
Fix i ∈ I. We define w i :H j,t → (w i (A), w i (A)) for each t ≤ T + 1 recursively as follows.
. For each t = 1, . . . , T andh j,t ∈H j,t , given that w i (h j,t ) ∈ (w i (A), w i (A)), it follows from the individual full rank that, for sufficiently small ε > 0, there exists {w i (h j,t , a j , y)} a j ∈A j ,y∈Y such that
for all a i,t ∈ A i with equality if a i,t ∈ A i , and w i (h j,t , a j,t , y t ) ∈ (w i (A), w i (A)) for all a j,t ∈ A j and y t ∈ Y , where the expectation is taken over (a j,t , ω j,t ) generated by (a i,t ,s j (h j,t )) and π. Further, |w i (h j,t , a j,t , y t ) − V i (h j,t , a j,t , y t )| goes to 0 as ε goes to 0 and |w i (h j,t ) − V i (h j,t )| goes to 0.
The following lemma shows that the set of belief-free equilibrium payoffs compatible with
A is lower hemicontinuous with respect to private-monitoring perturbations. For eachh 1,T +1 ∈H 1,T +1 ,h 2,T +1 ∈H 2,T +1 , since w 1 (h 2,T +1 ) ∈ (w 1 (A), w 1 (A)) and
, by Lemma 5, for sufficiently small ε > 0, there exists a belieffree equilibrium (σh
2 ) of the perturbed game starting in period T +1 that sustains (w 1 (h 2,T +1 ), w 2 (h 1,T +1 )). Note that, by the exchangeability of belief-free equilibria, we can assume without loss of generality that the choice of player 1's strategy is independent of h 2,T +1 , and that the choice of player 2's strategy is independent ofh 1,T +1 .
For each t ≥ 1, i ∈ I, and h i,t = (a
where T h i,t is the truncation of h i,t by removing the first T periods. Then s = (s 1 , s 2 ) is a belief-free equilibrium of the perturbed game that is (0, T )-close tos via f .
We can strengthen the positive result by allowing for a larger class of perturbations. In this direction, Theorem 2 extends easily to perturbed games that differ from the original game not only in the monitoring structure, but also in payoffs.
On 
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Claim 3
We construct an equilibrium s = (s 1 , s 2 ) in the perturbed game with ε > 0 that is close to the original equilibriums.
As explained in the main text, the strategy is recursive every other period. In period 1, both players are in state G, i.e., x 1 = x 2 = G. In each subsequent odd period t = 3, . . ., each player i determines a state x i ∈ {G, B}, and takes C if x i = G; D if x i = B. In period t + 1, she takes C if she observes ω i,t ∈ Ω
ii. After player j observes ω j,t / ∈ Ω ε j (i.e., ω j,t ∈ (−ε/2, ε/2)), we determine θ ε j [G](ω j,t , a j,t+1 , f j (ω j,t+1 )) so that player i is indifferent between C and D in period t + 1, conditional on a j,t+1 . Further, player i's expected payoff at the beginning of t + 1 is constant regardless of a t+1 :
Specifically, let
Note that we have not yet specified player j's strategy after observing ω j,t / ∈ Ω ε j . However, (16) guarantees that the specification of player j's action a j,t+1 after observing ω j,t / ∈ Ω ε j does not change player i's continuation payoff. Therefore,
is uniquely defined without specifying s j (G) after observing
Here is a good place to fully specify s i (x i ) for x i ∈ {G, B}. As mentioned in the main text, we choose player i's action a i,t+1 in period t + 1 that maximizes
(If there are multiple maximizers, choose one arbitrarily.) (c) In period t, we determine θ It is easy to find a solution for (19) for each ε such that
as ε → 0 for y = y,ȳ.
Now we show that the above strategy constitutes an equilibrium in the perturbed game.
First, we verify player i's incentive in period t + 1 after observing (a i,t , ω i,t ). Since any action is optimal if x j = B by 2-(b) (note that θ ε j [B](f j (ω j,t )) is a "sunk cost" in period t + 1), regardless of player i's belief about x j , player i plays a best response to s j (G). Further, Condition 1-(b)-ii ensures that player i plays a best response to s j (G) conditional on that ω j,t ∈ Ω ε j , regardless of player i's belief about ω j,t / ∈ Ω ε j . Conditional on the event that x j = G and ω j,t ∈ Ω ε j , Condition 1-(b)-i together with Lemma 1 implies that after observing ω i,t ∈ Ω ε i , player i believes with large probability that player j observes ω j,t ∈ f −1 j (f i (ω i,t )), i.e., player j's interpretation of ω j,t is the same as player i's interpretation of ω i,t . Note that player i has a strict incentive in the original equilibriums, and after ω j,t ∈ Ω ε j , we use the same reward function as in the original game. Thus, in the perturbed game, if ε is sufficiently small, player i strictly prefers C after observing ω i,t ∈ Ω (f i (h i,t ) ) if ω i,τ ∈ Ω ε i = R \ (−ε/2, ε/2) for all τ ≤ t − 1.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 4
Let ζ := (1 − p 1 − p 2 )/4 > 0. Let C 1 := 2 − 2(p 1 + 2ζ) ∈ [1, 2) and C 2 := 1 if p 1 ≤ p 2 , and 
Since Mεε converges to B/(2C 1 ) as ε goes to 0, (23) and (24) 
A.3 Proof of Lemma 5
Since W (A) is properly self-A-generating, takeγ > 0 such that, for every i ∈ I, w i (A)
is 
